The author responds to Professor Kottow's criticisms, explaining numerous errors and misconceptions.
It is hard to know how to respond politely to such a self-satisfied parody. I am tempted to say: tell that to the women with cervical cancer experimented on at National Women's Hospital in Auckland,3 tell that to the psychiatric survivors movement, tell that to patients of doctors happy to take whatever inducement drug companies throw onto their expense accounts, and tell that to the children who have been severely damaged by incompetent surgery4 and negligent physiotherapy in two recent scandals. But these malpracticesand the countless others I continually encounter in my work5 -are not the heart of the problem.
What I find so disturbing about Professor Kottow's serenity is that he seems unaware of the following demonstrable truths:
a) The goals of medicine are disputed.6 b) It is not always practically possible to be both benevolent and efficient.7 c) There is not enough medicine to go around, even in the developed world. an intention to cure disease with minimal harm. He says that this essence is "hardly amenable to ethical analysis", but this is not so. It is only unanalysable if the terms are allowed to remain obscure. When rendered meaningful, benevolence, efficiency and harm are contestable ideas (they are ethical B notions, in other words): to practise medicine according to them is to behave in one way rather than another. Presumably "being benevolent" does not mean discriminating against the sickest patients; "to cure with minimal harm" does not mean causing damage to some patients in order to bring about greater good in others, and being "technically efficient" in Kottow's sense rarely implies a quest for an even distribution of services.
Even if it does not entail these understandings, Kottow's essence must mean something specific in practice. Medics -to be medics at all -must commit to particular ways of intervening. No one can commit to ethics A because: "Ethical A is a pervasive phenomenon of (competent) human life. 
when quoting from his Liberating Medicine ... . (O)ne can easily read this text as proposing that physicians reach such high degrees of insight and sensibility, that they will be in danger of reverting to a strong brand of paternalism that takes decisions in the name of patients."2 I have four objections to this suggestion. Firstly, it takes quite some imagination to turn "effective, sensitive decisions"2 15 into "strong paternalism". It is certainly not easy to read this in, even from the isolated extract. Secondly, it is far easier to suppose that Kottow himself is in favour of strong paternalism, since he thinks medicine has a universal, benevolent essence which cannot be specified (a classic recipe for paternalism). Thirdly, because a brief quote makes no mention of "counselling" and "deferring to the wishes of autonomous patients" this is hardly evidence that these ideas are not advanced elsewhere in the book. Fourthly, it is astonishing that a learned professor should not bother to look at the book itself before making (and publishing) ridiculous guesses. If he had done even the most perfunctory research into my work he would have realised how woefully misdirected his criticism is. '6 Kottow is further puzzled by my paper, Why bioethicists have nothing useful to say about health care rationing, in which I argue that bioethicists make inadequate assumptions about social reality and use rational methods to solve problems that have arisen in non-rational or irrational contexts. Like my other criticisms of medical ethics this observation is commonplace amongst health workers on the ground, who are well aware that what matters in the medical world is power and influence rather than reason and logic. 8 Nevertheless Professor Kottow can't understand it.
He seems so blinded by convention (is it really the case that ethics committees produce arguments more coherent than those produced by individuals?) that he cannot read what is on the page. Apparently I "lament" that clinical interactions in terminally ill neonates are based on "hunches and feelings". But I don't. I merely describe what is the case (and nowhere do I say the baby was terminally ill -she wasn't). Furthermore, enriching the "texture" of hunches is not bound to make them "more generally acceptable" as Kottow imagines -it can have quite the opposite effect, of course. Nor can medical ethics: "... specify whose hunches, feelings and rationale (sic) must (sic) prevail in a clinical dilemma"2 because -even according to Kottow' Indeed he does not define any of these terms so it is impossible to judge whether fear and religion really are less rational than bioethics. We are left, as we almost always are in medical ethics/ bioethics, with assertions passing for arguments, and fairytales about progress and unity. We are assured, for example, that rational analysis can reduce conflicts between logic and value so that everyone involved will be respected equally. But Kottow gives no examples either of how conflicts between values and logic can be reduced by rational analysis (is it really so obvious that they can?) or of actual situations in which bioethics has ensured universal equal respect for all involved.
Despite Professor Kottow's certainty that I am in a minority of one I am sure that I'm not alone in recognising that this -and many similar -circuitous apologies for medical ethics are designed to leave the status quo -with all its inequity and greeduntouched and as politically powerful as ever.
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